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Regulating TV Violence: An




The problem of television violence has once again become a focus of public and
government concern. Responding to the threat of regulation by the CRTC and Par-
liament, an independent broadcasters' group has instituted a standards code that
regulates televised violence. The author argues that the code is a product of govern-
ment coercion and is ultimately enforced by the CRTC, and so should be considered
government regulation. He examines whether the Code could be challenged as an
infringement on the Charter of Rights guarantee offreedom of expression. Analysis
suggests that as long as the courts rely on dubious rationales justifying the strict reg-
ulation of broadcasting, and maintain an inappropriate deference to the government
in Charter cases, most of the Code would be viewed as a justified infringement. The
CRTC has suggested that television violence presents a pressing public health prob-
lem, and so requires regulation. The author writes that this argument masks a desire
to force on broadcasters a view of proper social conduct. This underlying moralism
may comport with modern republican legal theory, which would allow speech reg-
ulation to serve the aims of a democractic polity, but it violates the Charter's role
as a guarantor of rights against unreasonable state action. Ultimately, the issue
illuminates the risks involved in allowing the government to regulate expression on
the basis of a purported emergency.
La violence & la tilvision est devenue, une fois de plus, le point de mire des
preoccupations du public et des gouvernements. Afin d'dviter qu'une rdglementation
soit imposie par le CRTC ou par le Parlement, un groupe indipendant de radio-
diffuseurs vient d'dtablir un code de conduite visant a contrOler la violence a la
tdldvision. Selon l'auteur, ce Code est le produit de la coercition itatique et c'est
* The author would like to thank M. David Lepofsky, for suggesting this paper topic and providing
much useful advice, the editors of the Law Review for their many helpful suggestions, and
McMillan Binch, for their generous support of legal scholarship.
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le CRTC qui, en 'fin de compte, l'appliquera; il doit donc 9tre considire comme
une r6glementation provenant d gouvernement. L'auteur s'interroge sur la pos-
sibilit6 de contester le Code en se fondant sur la garantie constitutionnelle de la
libert6 d'expression. Son analyse revle que, pour la plupart, le Code sera perfue
par les tribunaux comme une restriction l6gitime, aussi longtemps que les tribunaux
s'appuieront sur des explications douteuses pour justifier une riglementation stricte
de la radiodiffusion et maintiendront, en matire de Charte, leur attitude excessive-
ment d~f6rente. Le CRTC a suggiri que la violence il la telvision, du fait qu'elle
soulave des prioccupations urgentes au niveau de la sant publique, doit faire l'objet
d'une r~glementation. Selon l'auteur, cet argument dissimule la volontd d'imposer
aux radiodiffuseurs une opinion de la conduite sociale appropride. II se peut que
ce moralisme soit compatible avec la nouvelle thforie republicaine du droit, qui
accepte que l'expression soit rdglementde pour les fins d'un rdgime dmocratique;
mais ce moralisme contredit la mission de la Charte, qui est de protger les droits
contre les abus 6tatiques. Finalement, l'examen de cette question permet d'eclairer
les dangers qui sont cr66s lorsque le gouvernement a le pouvoir de r6glementer
l'expression en pr6tendant qu'il s'agit d'une situation d'urgence.
The historian Arnold Toynbee has pointed out that 19 of 21 civilizations have died
from within and not by conquests from without. He tells us that there were no bands
playing or flags waving when these civilizations decayed. It happened slowly in the
quiet and the dark when no one was aware of what was happening.
A democratic society carries no inborn guarantee that it will survive on its own
merits. We have seen many such societies perish even in our time. A free society
cannot be taken for granted. Truth and freedom must be guarded as precious treasures.
The foundation to support the civil liberties we enjoy today is dependent upon the
vigilance exercised by those who can recognize and who will protect and oppose
invasion of their liberties by governments, national, provincial, or municipal.1
- The Hon. Emmett Hall, former
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada
We are going to continue taking a non-legalistic approach to this. We will have parents
and teachers working with the industry, the industry making the decisions with a keen
sense of the public interest, and not allowing futile kabuki theater arguments about free
speech and censorship to pollute a debate which is really [about] a medical problem.
2
- Keith Spicer, Chairman, Canadian Radio-Television
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)
1. Hall J., "Foreword" in A.A. Borovoy, The Fundamentals of Our Fundamental Freedoms: A
Primer on Civil Liberties and Democracy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canadian Civil Liberties Education
Trust, 1978), quoted in Report of the Standing Committee on Communications and Culture:
Television Violence: Fraying Our Social Fabric (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, June 1993) at xiii
[hereinafter Fraying Our Social Fabric].
2. K. Spicer, Chairman, Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, on
Between the Lines (TVO television broadcast, 9 December 1993) [hereinafter Between the Lines].
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Introduction
Television violence, which has recently become a target of renewed concern in both
Canada and the United States, raises a problem central to the debate over freedom
of expression. General principles, such as fear of the 'slippery slope' of regulation,
are pitted against starkly presented concerns (of greater or lesser validity) about the
harmful consequences of this form of expression. This conflict between the dangers
of granting to the state the power to regulate expression, and the consequences of
limiting the state's power in this regard-between contingency and emergency-
lies at the heart of Charter3 litigation concerning unpopular speech. As this article
will show, however, a so-called 'emergency' may serve as a pretext for laws whose
actual purpose is to advance improperly a particular moral agenda by allowing some
forms of expression and restricting others.
The power of the 'emergency' argument to distort perspectives on speech regu-
lation may be seen in this article's epigraphs, both of which arose recently in the
television violence debate. Taken together, they illuminate the degree to which
raising the spectre of a sufficiently worrisome harm may curtail thoughtful con-
sideration of the risks of restricting expression, and allow the government to act
in the name of public safety to banish from the airwaves expression that it finds
distasteful.
Viewed on its face, Hall J.'s statement seems to warn citizens to keep watch,
even in "the quiet and the dark," against the state's slow encroachment on their
liberty. "[G]ovemments, national, provincial, or municipal," are the subject of
Hall J.'s warning. In its 1993 report on television violence, however, the House
of Commons' Standing Committee on Communications and Culture gives Hall's
words a radically different interpretation:
[S]ocieties can disintegrate from within if the values that these societies cherish are
allowed to decay by a slow, subtle attrition. Justice Hall reminds us that a society
needs to be vigilant in opposing such an invasion of its democratic values.
The Committee believes that the problem ... of television violence.., could lead
to the fraying of our modem civilization unless a comprehensive strategy is developed
to arrest such invidious progress.
4
The Committee shifts its concern from a fear that the liberty to express certain
values may be taken away to a warning that the wrong values may hold sway,
effectively clothing a moral concern in the language of impending social crisis.
CRTC Chairman Keith Spicer's comments take this approach further, removing the
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b) [hereinafter Charter].
4. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at xv.
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expression in question from the sphere of right or wrong values and classifying it
as a "medical problem."5
This represents a triumph of the 'emergency' approach to speech restrictions;
once a particular form of expression is viewed as giving rise to a health con-
cern, rather than simply representing a statement of values, concerns about the
appropriateness of state censorship may be considered academic and swept aside.
Underneath this characterization of the issue, however, the presence of a fundamen-
tally moralistic viewpoint can still be sensed, a viewpoint that is only tenuously
connected to any real sense of emergency.
Events suggest that concerns about the appropriateness of state censorship are
hardly academic. In October 1993, in response to government pressure, the Cana-
dian Association of Broadcasters (CAB), a private broadcasting industry group, re-
leased a revised code ("the Code") regulating televised violence on private networks;6
the Code took effect on January 1, 1994.1 The Code imposes content and scheduling
restrictions on programming for both children and adults, and establishes a ratings
and warning system to alert viewers to violent programming. The Code will be
administered by a private body, the Canadian Broadcast Standards Council (CBSC).
The CRTC has told broadcasters, however, that adherence to the Code will be a
"condition of licence."
8
This article will examine the Code's legal implications, focusing on whether it
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of the guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion in s. 2(b) of the Charter.9 Part I will briefly recount the events leading to
the Code's introduction. Part II will describe the Code and how it is administered.
Part I will examine the conflicting social science research which has served as the
basis for government action, and which would be an issue in any future Charter
challenge. Part IV examines issues that would arise in a constitutional challenge to
the Code. Even if the regulations are viewed as more than private rules, they would
likely survive a challenge as "reasonable limits prescribed by law... [and] demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society,"1 though it will be argued that a
number of persuasive constitutional arguments can and should be raised against the
Code. Part V will look at the implications of allowing such content regulations.
Finally, Parts VI and VII will suggest that these content regulations do not
constitute appropriate state action. While they purport to address a social emer-
gency, the real effect of the television violence regulations is to attempt to enforce
5. See also J.A. Albert, "Constitutional Regulation of Televised Violence" (1978) 64 Va. L. Rev.
1299 at 1305. This article quotes the AMA calling televised violence "a risk factor threatening
the health and welfare of young Americans, indeed our future society." (citation omitted)
6. CRTC, Public Notice 1993-149, "Voluntary Code Regarding Violence in Television
Programming" (28 October 1993) App. A [hereinafter Code].
7. CRTC, Public Notice 1993-149, "Voluntary Code Regarding Violence in Television
Programming" (28 October 1993) at 4 [hereinafter CRTC Public Notice].
8. Ibid. at4.
9. The section declares: "Everyone has the following freedoms... (b) freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
10. Charter, supra note 3, s. 1.
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an orthodoxy of values. This may conform to the civic republican viewpoint in
legal theory, which would allow speech regulation in order to serve fundamental
democratic goals and values. Ultimately, however, the moralistic approach may un-
dermine other justifications for protecting freedom of expression. This approach is
further supported by a widespread "profound sense of ambivalence about Canada's
mass media,"" a feeling which has arguably led to the unjustified result that the
broadcast media are more strictly regulated than any other medium of expression.
I. History of the Code
Televised violence has been the object of Canadian government attention on previ-
ous occasions. Most notably, in the mid-1970's, the Ontario government established
the LaMarsh Commission, which was asked to explore the broader issue of "the
possible harm to the public interest of the increasing exploitation of violence in the
communications industry," including the broadcast media.' 2
More recently, renewed interest in the subject was spurred by several events
which occurred in 1992. First, in May of that year, the CRTC released a study
which examined past social science research on the effects of televised violence
and concluded that "most studies agree that there is a positive, though weak, re-
lation between exposure to television violence and aggressive behaviour."' 3 (An
earlier study had detailed the results of previous inquiries into media violence, and
summarized broadcasting standards in other countries.)
4
Second, a 14-year-old girl, Virginie Larivi~re, convinced that televised violence
was responsible for the sexual assault and murder of her 11-year-old sister, gathered
the signatures of 1.3 million Canadians on a petition urging Parliament to force
a reduction in onscreen violence; the petition was referred by Parliament to the
Standing Committee on Communications and Culture on November 18, 1992."5
This led to hearings by the Committee, and a subsequent Committee report entitled
Fraying Our Social Fabric which was drafted by a Sub-Committee on Violence on
Television. The report concluded:
The inconclusiveness of [the link between televised and actual violence] ... has led
us away from recommending that the government legislate outright against television
violence at this time. Instead, we have come to the conclusion that the problem of
11. M.D. Lepofsky, "The Role of 'The Press' in Freedom of the Press" (1992) 3 M.C.L.R. 89 at 90
(referring to both broadcast and print media).
12. Ontario, Interim Report of the Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, January 1976) at 1-3.
13. CRTC, Scientific Knowledge About Television Violence by A. Martinez (Hull, Que.: CRTC, 1992)
at 47.
14. CRTC, Summary and Analysis of Various Studies on Violence and Television by D. Atkinson,
M. Gourdeau & F. Savageau (Hull, Que.: CRTC, 1991).
15. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at 1.
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violence should be addressed co-operatively, by all the players, including the industry,
parents and governments, and with minimal legislative intervention.
16
At the same time, CRTC Chairman Spicer made speeches to industry repre-
sentatives, urging them to take action themselves. He told the Committee that
"a tough industry code and an effective standards council were two critical ele-
ments the industry had to deliver on."17 The Canadian Association of Broadcasters,
which includes most private broadcasting networks but does not include the Cana-
dian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), pay-TV, or specialty networks, responded
in May 1992 with meetings of its Joint Societal Issues and Trends Committee to
consider a revised violence code with stricter terms for member networks; 8 the
initial code, published in 1987, lacked CRTC approval.19
It is important to note that the Code, although promulgated by the CAB, is in
fact the direct result of substantial government pressure. Spicer has referred to
the CRTC's approach as one of "masterful wooing."'2 While stating its preference
for voluntary solutions, the Commission warns: "Already an impressive number of
Canadians are demanding ... coercive action. If we cannot make progress by the
voluntary, cooperative route, it's clear that pressure on politicians for legislative or
other legal solutions may become overwhelming." '2 The Hon. Perrin Beatty, the
former Minister of Communications, also made it clear that the CAB's actions would
meet with strict government scrutiny: 'The Canadian Association of Broadcasters
has just rewritten their code and it remains to be seen how effective it will be. If
it isn't tough enough, I will ask the CRTC to write and enforce one that is."'
16. Ibid. at 69-70.
17. Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No.
58 (24 February 1993) at 7.
18. Interview with Peter O'Neill (19 November 1993), Toronto [unpublished]. Mr. O'Neill is
Director of Public Affairs & Strategic Planning and the Corporate Secretary of the CTV
Television Network. He chairs the CAB's Joint Societal Issues and Trends Committee, which
drafted the Code. Interview on file with author.
19. The previous Code was adopted in January 1987. In contrast to the revised Code, which adopts a
sterner tone and creates a number of positive obligations for broadcasters, see Part II, below, the
older version is written as a series of recommendations, urging broadcasters to "exercise care" in
programming. It also suggests that broadcasters air advisory warnings before and during
programs "[w]here appropriate," but leaves this decision to the broadcaster. Canadian Association
of Broadcasters, "Voluntary Code Regarding Violence in Television Programming (1987)" in P.S.
Grant, A.H.A. Keenleyside & M. Racicot, eds., 1993 Canadian Broadcast and Cable Regulatory
Handbook (Ottawa: McCarthy Ttrult, 1993) at 408.
20. Between the Lines, supra note 2.
21. K. Spicer, "Restoring Childhood to Children: Towards an Alliance for Less Violent Television"
(Address to the C.M. uincks Institute, 19 February 1993) in Standing Committee on
Communications and Culture, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 57 (23 February 1993)
at A-13.
22. P. Beatty, "Entertaining Ourselves to Death" (Address to the C.M. Hincks Institute, 19 February
1993) in ibid. at A-4.
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II. Provisions and Administration of the Code
The Code's provisions may be divided according to their function: content regula-
tion affecting programming for children and adults, regulatory guidelines for news
and public affairs programming, scheduling regulations, and program advisories and
classifications.
Section 1 of the Code, entitled "Content," opens with a general prohibition:
Canadian broadcasters shall not air programming which:
" contains gratuitous violence in any form*
" sanctions, promotes or glamorizes violence
* "Gratuitous" means material which does not play an integral role in developing
the plot, character or theme of the material as a whole.23
More specifically, the Code prohibits programming which "sanctions, promotes
or glamorizes" violence against women 24 or animals,25 or violence "based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age, or mental
or physical disability." No definition of "sanctions, promotes or glamorizes" is
given. The section dealing with violence against women does provide one further
direction, noting that any violence which is present must be "integral to the story
being told."'27
Section 2 provides a series of regulations concerning children's programming,
defined as programming targeted at children under 12. Broadcasters are cautioned:
"Very little violence, either physical, verbal or emotional shall be portrayed in
children's programming.""
The regulations also determine the permissible parameters of televised violence in
children's programming. Violence involving "real-life characters" shall be limited to
occasions "when it is essential to the development of character and plot"; animated
shows are "accepted as a stylized form of storytelling which can contain non-
realistic violence," but the violence cannot be the show's "central theme," nor may
it invite "dangerous imitation." 29 Realistic scenes of violence must not "create the
impression that violence is the preferred way, or the only method to resolve conflict
between individuals"; they must also "portray, in human terms, the consequences
of that violence to its victims and its perpetrators."3 More generally, broadcasters
are told to "deal carefully" with themes that "could threaten their [children's] sense
23. Code, supra note 6, ss 1.0-1.1.
24. Ibid. s. 7.1.
25. Ibid. s. 9.1.
26. Ibid. s. 8.1.
27. Ibid. s. 7.2.
28. Ibid. s. 2.1.
29. Ibid. ss 2.2-2.3.
30. Ibid. ss 2.6-2.7.
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of security," or which could lead to imitation-for example, "dangerous physical
acts such as climbing apartment balconies or rooftops." 3'
The Code's regulation of news and public affairs programs consists mostly of
rules which leave decisions in the hands of the broadcaster. News departments are
urged to use "appropriate editorial judgment," "caution," or "discretion" in reporting
on and showing violence, aggression, and "explicit or graphic language related to
stories of destruction, accidents or sexual violence, which could disturb children
and their families. '32  They are warned to be particularly cautious in covering
domestic terrorism or civil unrest, "to ensure news coverage does not become a
factor in inciting additional violence. 3 3 The Code adds: '"While broadcasters shall
not exaggerate or exploit situations of aggression, conflict or confrontation, equal
care shall be taken not to sanitize the reality of the human condition."' Finally, the
Code tells broadcasters to refer to the Code of Ethics of the Radio-Television News
Directors Association of Canada "for guidance regarding broadcast journalism in
general." 35
The Code's scheduling provisions restrict programs, promotions, and advertise-
ments containing "scenes of violence intended for adult audiences" to the time slot
between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m.,36 thus establishing a "watershed" point similar to the
one imposed by broadcasters in England at the behest of the British government.
37
Canadian broadcasters sometimes import and air over their stations the broadcast
signals of American programs, a practice known as substitution; the Code says that
when Canadian broadcasters substitute the broadcast signals.of American programs
that air before the watershed hour, the prohibition against scenes of violence does
not apply. But CAB members are warned "at no time [to] avail themselves of sub-
stitution rights over programming which contains gratuitous violence in any form
or which sanctions, promotes or glamorizes violence."
38
Finally, the Code sets up a classification and warning regime. The classification
categories have not yet been released; the Code simply says they will "provide
guidelines on content and the intended audience for programming. ' 39 As for warn-
ings, the Code directs broadcasters to air viewer advisory notices alerting audiences
to programs containing violent scenes which are "intended for adult audiences."
40
31. Ibid. ss 2.4-2.5.
32. Ibid. ss 6.1-6.4.
33. Ibid. s. 6.5.
34. Ibid. s. 6.6.
35. Ibid. s. 6.7.
36. Ibid. ss 3.1.1., 3.2-3.3.
37. See e.g. British Broadcasting Corporation, The portrayal of violence in televisions programmes:
Suggestions for a revised note of guidance (London: B.B.C., 1979) at 10; Fraying Our Social
Fabric, supra note 1 at 113-14.
38. Code, supra note 6, ss 3.1.3-3.1.4.
39. Ibid. s. 4.1.
40. Ibid. s. 5.1. Section 5.2 states that viewer advisories for programs before the watershed must be
aired prior to programming which "contains scenes of violence not suitable for children."
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Primary responsibility for administering the Code rests in the hands of the CBSC,
an independent industry standards council established in part to provide a review
process for viewers' complaints that is independent of the CRTC. The process allows
broadcasters an opportunity to respond to complaints; then, if a CBSC regional
council finds that the broadcaster is at fault, the offending network must prominently
announce that judgment on the air.4
The CRTC has announced that broadcasters who are members in good standing of
the CBSC-and thus who presumably comply with the Code-will be considered
to have met the licence requirement of following the Code, but it promises to
"monitor closely the resolution of complaints about television violence."42 Private
broadcasters who are not CBSC members are also required to follow the Code's
dictates.43
1I. Social Science Research on Televised Violence
Before considering the constitutionality of the Code, it is important to have some
understanding of the results of social science research into the issue of the conse-
quences of televised violence. This subject has been amply covered elsewhere."
Nevertheless, the research is central to constitutional arguments that may be made
both for and against the Code. It may have particular impact on the question
of whether the courts should be deferential to government justifications for content
regulation, thus adding more weight to the state's side of the underlying emergency-
contingency debate.
Despite the mass of research on the subject--one study estimated that there
are over 1,000 research publications on the relationship between televised and real
violence 45 -conclusions about the relationship have remained remarkably tentative.
One set of researchers concludes that "[tihe evidence at present favors the hy-
pothesis that exposure to television violence increases the likelihood of subsequent
aggressiveness."46 Another group asserts: "This study did not find evidence that
41. Interview with Peter O'Neill, supra note 18.
42. CRTC Public Notice, supra note 7 at 4-5.
43. Ibid.
44. See e.g. E. Campbell, "Television Violence: Social Science vs. the Law" (1990) 10 Loy. Ent. L.J.
413 at 419-36; G. Cumberbatch & D. Howitt, A Measure of Uncertainty: The Effects of the Mass
Media (London: John Libbey & Co., 1989); T.G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe Jr., "Televised
Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory" (1978) 64 Va. L. Rev. 1123
at 1134-70; J.R. Milavsky et al., Television and Aggression: A Panel Study (New York:
Academic Press, 1982); S. Milgramn & R.L. Shotland, Television and Antisocial Behavior: Field
Experiments (New York: Academic Press, 1973); Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory
Committee on Television and Behavior, Television and Growing Up: The Impact of Televised
Violence (1972) [hereinafter Surgeon General's Report]; Scientific Knowledge About Television
Violence, supra note 12; Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1.
45. Cumberbatch & Howitt, ibid. at 32.
46. G. Comstock et al., Television and Human Behavior (New York: Columbia University Press,
1978) at 247.
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television violence was causally implicated in the development of aggressive be-
havior patterns among children and adolescents. . . " adding later that "if such
children exist, they constitute such a small portion of the sample that we could not
draw conclusions from observing them. 47 Even studies reaching strong conclusions
often add caveats to their findings, as one writer noted:
The carefully modulated rhythms of conclusiveness and caution are played and re-
played. A major general finding is put forward, it is carefully modified, and then it is
subtly reinstated again... Over and over again, the weight of the collective evidence
is invoked and then cautiously softened...
The uncertainty in the field can be attributed to two methodological difficulties.
First, social scientists have suggested that laboratory experiments on the subject
create an unnatural environment which does not reflect television viewing in the real-
world environment, and that the experiments cannot effectively measure subjects'
propensity to be more aggressive in real situations.49 Second, surveys and field
experiments have been faulted for their inability to determine whether behavioural
changes are caused by television viewing or other environmental factors. 50
Indeed, despite over three decades of study in the field, the most generally
agreed-upon statement appears to be one made virtually at the dawn of research
into television violence:
For some children, under some conditions, some television is harmful .... For most




Given this mild conclusion, the report of the Standing Committee on Communi-
cations and Culture is appropriately restrained in its findings:
If the ongoing initiatives to reduce the amount of violence on Canadian television
screens should fail, and if a higher level of government action should subsequently
be required, it seems to the Committee that the government would then need more
Canadian evidence than presently exists.
5 2
The CRTC's conclusions, although based on the same evidence, are voiced con-
siderably more vigorously, but they too back away from a suggestion that real
47. J. Milavsky et al., supra note 44 at 487.
48. W.D. Rowland Jr., The Politics of TV Violence: Policy Uses of Communication Research (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1983) at 231.
49. See e.g. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 44 at 39-41.
50. See e.g. Cumberbatch & Howitt, supra note 44 at 1.
51. W. Schramm, J. Lyle & E.B. Parker, Television in the Lives of Our Children (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1961) at 1 (emphasis in original).
52. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at 18.
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violence will be the direct result of viewing televised violence. They focus less on
whether television violence will result in increased acts of aggression-a result that
would lend credence to claims that the issue constitutes a medical problem-and
more on the exacerbation of social problems that are arguably less urgent and direct,
but much easier to prove:
[Studies] have pretty conclusively confirmed the link between massive, gratuitous TV
violence and desensitization of children, leading to greater tolerance for real-life vio-
lence, emotional problems, school-yard bullying, and learning problems.
53
This 'defining downward' of claims about the possible effects of televised vio-
lence, from actual violence to more general symptoms of social malaise, is signif-
icant for two reasons. First, as I have indicated, it does not accord with Spicer's
claim that television violence presents a "medical problem," 4 since the effects de-
scribed above fall short of the direct causal link to increased violence that is the
elusive object of studies in this area. Second, the CRTC position on the effects of
television violence-whether the Commission asserts that television violence cre-
ates a medical problem or simply that it has unwanted social effects-would likely
serve as the basis for a s. 1 test in the justification stage of a Charter challenge.
Accordingly, the seriousness and likelihood of the potential social harm posited
by the CRTC will influence whether the courts will uphold such an infringement
under s. 1.
Finally, it should be noted that the CAB "put . . . aside" the question of the
effects of televised violence when it drafted the revised Code."5 Any argument
as to whether the government has a pressing and substantial need to infringe this
speech would thus have to rely on the CRTC position.
IV. The Constitutionality of the Code
(A) DOES IT CONSTITUTE GOVERNMENT ACTION?
The first objection to a constitutional challenge of the Code is obvious: Why is this
a constitutional problem at all? The Charter's strictures apply to "the Parliament
and government of Canada." 6 The Code is written and administered by private
groups, and bears the word "voluntary" in its title. Why should the government be
called upon to defend the constitutionality of a provision it merely endorses?
53. Spicer, supra note 21 at A-I1; see also Scientific Knowledge About Television Violence, supra
note 13 at 26-27 (discussing desensitization).
54. Between the Lines, supra note 2.
55. Telephone interview with Peter Miller (14 December 1993) [unpublished]. Mr. Miller is the
CAB's counsel. Interview on file with author.
56. Charter, supra note 3, s. 32(1): "This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament .. " (emphasis added).
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Two arguments may be raised in favour of viewing the Code as government
action, or at the least as the progeny of such action. First, the Code is the direct
result of the coercive powers of the CRTC and the government and its "masterful
wooing." Part I, above, recounted the statements of the Standing Committee on
Communications and Culture, the CRTC, and the Minister of Communications,
warning private broadcasters that if they did not act, regulators would do so. It
seems unreasonable to suggest that the government can achieve more through the
threat of regulation than it might accomplish by actual regulation, which is subject
to Charter challenge. To avoid this result, the coercive measures used by the
government should be enough to bring the Code into the constitutional field.
A similar argument was raised in the United States in the 1970's, when the
Federal Communications Comnnission (F.C.C.) adopted a tactic closely resembling
the CRTC approach. In the wake of public pressure following the release of the
Surgeon General's report on televised violence and the attendant Congressional
hearings, the Chairman of the FCC entered into a process of "jawboning" American
broadcasters, urging them to self-regulate sex and violence on television "without
the need for any 'formal' Commission action."'57 As a result, in 1975 the major
broadcasters agreed to institute a "family viewing hour," an hour of non-violent
programming in the early evening. In an action alleging First Amendment violation,
the Writers Guild of America charged that the family viewing policy resulted from
the pressure that the FCC placed on the networks.
This claim was successful in federal district court, where ajudge ruled that "gov-
ernmeit pressure substantially caused the adoption of the family viewing policy
which deprived the individual licensees of their right and duty to make independent
decisions. This deprivation violated the First Amendment."5' The Ninth Circuit re-
versed the decision, on other grounds. In dicta, the Court said, "Regulation through
'raised eyebrow' techniques or through forceful jawboning is commonplace in the
administrative context"; however, it continued, "[W]e agree that the use of these
techniques by the FCC presents serious issues involving the Constitution ... ,,59
Since the Court ruled that the case should first have gone through administrative
complaint procedures, it did not decide whether the policy was the result of state
action. Still, it is worth noting that this was left as a possibility.
Furthermore, the CRTC also plays a direct role in administering the Code, since
its power to refuse to grant licence renewals, or to shorten licence terms, is the
ultimate punishment for violating the Code. This power to disrupt broadcasters'
businesses and cause serious financial losses amounts to a coercive power. It obliges
broadcasters to control content to meet the CRTC's wishes, as the president of the
CAB noted in testimony before the Standing Committee on Communications and
Culture:
57. Writers Guild ofAmerica v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 at 359 (9th Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter Writers Guild].
58. Ibid. at 360, citing 423 F.Supp 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
59. Ibid. at 365.
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Short of very specific regulation in this area, which may be very difficult to write
without creating problems under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the CRTC is
now in a position to say to a broadcaster who they think is performing badly to clean
up, and the next time they are around for a [licence] renewal, to give a one-year
renewal instead of a five- or a seven-year renewal.... Do you know what that means
to a company? It costs $250,000 to do another renewal application a year later, and
they love that.
60
This thought is echoed in an essay by the late Bazelon J., of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States:
Mhe government has fostered network sensitivity to government wishes by making
clear that the failure to respond to the government's concept of appropriate program
content would jeopardize the all-valuable license. I am reminded of one broadcaster
who observed: "We live or die ... by the FCC gun."...
When the right to continue to operate a lucrative broadcast facility turns on peri-
odic government approval, even a governmental "raised eyebrow" can send otherwise
intrepid entrepreneurs running for the cover of conformity.
61
The CRTC has not simply exercised a power of moral persuasion here; by re-
serving the right to punish violations of the Code by changing licensees' status, the
CRTC has made the Code a government regulation. The Commission has said that,
"[f]or the purposes of assessing compliance" by members of the Canadian Broad-
cast Standards Council, it will only consider the scheduling section of the Code.62
Nevertheless, this still constitutes some CRTC intervention, and it is reasonable to
suppose that blatant and unchecked violation of other sections of the Code by CBSC
members would also lead to CRTC action. Furthermore, non-CBSC members will
also fall within the scope of CRTC regulation.'
Whether the CRTC is itself a governmental body, and thus subject to the con-
straints of the Charter,' could also be questioned, since the CRTC for the most
part acts independently of Parliament when it sets out policy and promulgates reg-
ulations. This is not truly the case, however. Although the CRTC has been in-
dependently active on the issue of television violence, the Parliament's Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture clearly viewed the CRTC as a gov-
ernment actor when it compelled the Commission to act in Recommendation No.
60. Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,
No. 57 (23 February 1993) at 19.
61. Bazelon, D.L., "The First Amendment and the 'New Media'-New Directions in Regulating
Telecommunications" in D. Brenner & W.L. Rivers, eds., Free But Regulated: Conflicting
Traditions in Media Law (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982) at 55-56 [hereinafter Free
But Regulated].
62. CRTC Public Notice, supra note 7 at 5.
63. Ibid. at 4-5.
64. Charter, supra note 3, s. 32(1).
358 Toronto, Faculty of Law Review Volume 52, Number 2
19 of the Fraying Our Social Fabric report, under a section headed "Legislative
Action by Government":
In terms of an overall strategy for addressing violent programming on television, the
Committee recommends a graduated approach. The Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission should begin by immediately making a few key
regulations to complement the self-regulatory efforts of the industry and to symbolize
the need for programming reform and, in the event that industry self-regulation proves
ineffective, the Commission should then move to produce stricter regulations, giving
due consideration to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.6
In any case, the CRTC falls easily within the definition of a government actor
articulated by the Supreme Court in McKinney v. University of Guelph.6 In that
case, in the context of a suit alleging that several universities' mandatory retirement
policies violated the Charter, the Court held that universities were not government
actors. Referring to the discussion of the Canada Labour Code in Slaight Commu-
nications Inc. v. Davidson,' LaForest J. noted that "[i]t would be strange if the
legislature and the government could evade their Charter responsibility by appoint-
ing a person to carry out the purposes of the statute." 68 He added, however, that
to constitute government action, it is not enough that an actor has been created by
statute; the person or entity must be acting "to facilitate the performance of tasks
assigned to government."69
This definition surely embraces the CRTC. Section 3(2) of the Broadcasting Act7"
suggests that the objectives of the government's broadcasting policy as set out in
the Act should be secured by a "single independent public authority"--a clear
description of the CRTC. Its power and purpose plainly derive from the Act, and
from its role as the vehicle for the achievement of the government's broadcasting
policy goals. Since the Commission and its duties are wholly a creation of the
government, it cannot be said to be carrying out some traditional, non-governmental
function.
It is argued, then, that the combination of extralegal pressure and actual reg-
ulation by the CRTC, a government body, brings the Code within the field of
constitutional challenge. Further discussion in this article proceeds on the assump-
tion that the Code is effectively a government regulation. Even if one does not
accept this argument, it is still worthwhile to press on in considering the Code's
65. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at 73.
66. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter McKinney].
67. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
68. McKinney, supra note 66 at 265.
69. Ibid. at 266.
70. S.C. 1991, c. 11, replacing R.S.C. 1985, c. B-9.
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constitutionality, given the warnings by legislators and regulators that they may yet
introduce statutory or regulatory provisions.
(B) DOES THE CODE INFRINGE THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?
If the Code can be treated as government regulation, it is likely that it would be
viewed as an infringement of freedom of expression. The bedrock test of infringe-
ment is stated in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.-G.):
We cannot, then, exclude human activity from the scope of guaranteed free expression
on the basis of the content or meaning being conveyed. Indeed, if the activity conveys
or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within
the scope of the guarantee.
71
This does not suggest that the meaning conveyed must be significant; it merely
notes that activity whose purpose is the conveyance of meaning may be considered
primafacie expression, thus distinguishing expressive acts from non-expressive acts.
Applying this test, several of the Code's regulations clearly regulate "expression."
Section 1.1 prohibits programming which "sanctions, promotes or glamorizes vio-
lence." The children's programming rules are generally content-oriented, as in the
prohibition in s. 2.6 of "realistic scenes of violence which create the impression that
violence is the preferred way." Similarly, violence which "sanctions, promotes or
glamorizes" women, members of specific groups, or animals is barred. By their very
terms, these provisions do not ban non-expressive violence, but target-and intend
to target7 2 -violence which conveys particular meanings or impressions. Thus, the
Code may be seen as infringing s. 2(b) of the Charter.
Some arguments may be raised against finding a s. 2(b) infringement, however.
First, "gratuitous" or "glamorized" violence could be seen as conveying nothing
in particular, or at least nothing that could not be expressed in other ways. As
was stated above, however, the Code's provisions actually define the prohibited
violence by reference to the meaning conveyed by particular representations of
violence. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court suggested in Ford v. Quebec (A.-G.),
one's choice of form in expressing something-in this case, one's use of violent
imagery-may be intimately connected to the meaning one wishes to convey, just as
a statement delivered angrily conveys a different meaning than a statement delivered
in a calm voice:
71. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.-G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 969, Dickson C.J.C. (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Irwin Toy].
72. See ibid. at 974: "If the government's purpose is to restrict the content of expression by singling
out particular meanings that are not to be conveyed, it necessarily limits the guarantee of free
expression."
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[T]here cannot be true freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited
from using the language of one's choice. Language is not merely a means or medium
of expression; it colours the content and meaning of expression.
73
It might also be argued that violent expression may be regulated in a way that is
consistent with the Charter given the dicta in Irwin Toy: "[V]iolence as a form of
expression receives no... protection."74 But a portrayal or recording of violence
is clearly an expressive representation of violence, and not a violent act per se.
More significant is the objection that the Charter guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion should apply to individuals, not to the corporations that operate broadcasting
services. Section 2 states: "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms...75
Does this language limit the protection to individuals, thus allowing the government
to regulate business without being lost in a thicket of Charter challenges? On the
other hand, would s. 2(b) not create a "hollow right" if its guarantee of "freedom of
the press and other media of communication" could not be invoked by the corporate
bodies that constitute the press and other media bodies?
76
Although the Supreme Court is still developing its doctrine on application of the
Charter to corporations, so far it has been willing to permit corporations to advance
s. 2(b) arguments; for example, it allowed the Edmonton Journal to challenge the
constitutionality of an Alberta law restraining publication of the details of divorce
or separation proceedings." In the absence of a criminal charge,7" the Court is
unwilling to allow corporations to take advantage of Charter provisions that they
cannot enjoy, such as the s. 7 right to security of the person or the s. 13 right
against self-incrimination.79 Corporations are capable of expression, however-
indeed, they are the primary vehicle of expression in the broadcast media-and so
ought to have recourse to the freedom of expression guarantee. While corporate
expression may have less value than individual expression, the place to resolve that
issue is surely in s. 1.
More generally, laws aimed at broadcasters will necessarily affect those individ-
uals who wish to use broadcasting networks to convey meaning, thus strengthening
73. Ford v. Quebec (A.-G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 748 [hereinafter Ford].
74. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 970.
75. Charter, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
76. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 830. For a
useful early discussion of the application of the Charter to corporations, see J.G. Richards, "The
Charter and Private and Public Sector Corporations: Scope and Application" in Canadian Institute
for Professional Development, The Charter and the Corporation: New Vistas for Corporate Rights
(Toronto: Canadian Institute for Professional Development, 1985) at A-I.
77. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.-G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
78. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (corporation may raise a s. 2(a) challenge
where it faces criminal penalties) [hereinafter Big M]; R v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3
S.C.R. 154 (corporation may raise a s. 7 defence to a regulatory offence with a quasi-criminal
penalty).
79. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 1004 (s. 7); see also Hogg, supra note 76 at 830-31 (s. 13), 1272-74
(s. 7).
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a corporate claim of standing.8° Moreover, as one commentator has observed, the
courts have "used their discretion to grant standing to corporations when the is-
sues are regarded as significantly important to the development of constitutional
jurisprudence."'"
In short, both policy and jurisprudence support a finding that the Code infringes
the s. 2(b) rights of both broadcasting corporations and the individuals using the
networks to communicate. 2 It is worth noting that both the CRTC and the Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture have acknowledged that, if content
regulations of televised violence were imposed by the government, the Charter
might be infringed. For instance, the Committee's report states:
The Committee recognizes that legislative action taken by Parliament or regulatory
measures imposed by the CRTC to control violence on television would clearly infringe
the freedom of expression. The debatable question arising from this scenario is whether
such intrusions could be allowed under section 1 of the Charter.8
3
(C) IS THE CODE PRESCRIBED BY LAW?
The Charter's guarantee of freedom of expression is not limitless; the right may
be infringed "only ... [by] such limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."84 The first question to consider, then,
is whether the Code constitutes limits that are prescribed by law. Discussion of
this question assumes that the Code may be treated as a CRTC regulation, since
compliance with the Code is a CRTC licence requirement.
The "prescribed by law" test poses two questions in this case. First, is there a
clear, defined limit to the CRTC's discretion? Second, are the provisions of the Code
impermissibly vague?8" It seems likely that the Code would pass both branches of
80. See e.g. J. Russell, "Demystifying Canadian Content: Challenging the Television Broadcast
Regulator to 'Say What It Means and Mean What It Says"' (1993) 3 M.C.L.R. 171 at 192-93.
81. Ibid. at 193.
82. Equally interesting is the question whether the CBC has standing to allege a s. 2(b) infringement
by the government, despite the fact that it is a Crown corporation. Since the CBC is not covered
by the Code, the issue is outside the scope of this article. Those who are interested in the topic
should note a recent case, National Party of Canada v. CBC (1993), 13 Alta. L.R. (3d) 20 (S.C.),
aff'd (1993), 13 Alta L.R. 29 (C.A.). In that case, both courts decided that the CBC's refusal to
give the National Party a spot on a televised debate was a programming decision which was
non-governmental. The logical consequence of this would seem to be that where the government
intrudes on the CBC's independent exercise of its programming judgment, the CBC should have
standing to challenge the infringement, especially since viewers' rights are implicated. This is a
sensible result, since, as with the universities in McKinney, the CBC is acting in a role
traditionally assumed by private actors-that of broadcaster. See supra notes 66-69 and
accompanying text.
83. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at 58.
84. Charter, supra note 3, s. 1 (emphasis added).
85. See Hogg, supra note 76 at 866.
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the test. First, the CRTC is not given unfettered discretion to regulate content; in the
context of television violence, it acts pursuant to the Broadcasting Act's declaration
that "the programming originated by broadcasting undertakings should be of high
standard. 86 Thus, its regulatory powers are subject to an "intelligible standard."
87
Furthermore, the Code itself narrows and clarifies the range of the CRTC's
discretion, at least in the field of television violence. In Ontario Film & Video
Appreciation Society v. Ontario (Board of Censors), the Ontario Court of Appeal
invalidated a statute permitting film censorship, partly on the grounds that the film
board's censorship criteria were non-binding and thus lacked the force of law.8
It was argued above that despite the CAB's voluntary imposition of the Code,
the Code's provisions should be treated in the same way as CRTC regulations,
particularly since they ultimately constitute an enforceable licence requirement. If
this is so, then the Code has the force of law and is binding. It therefore provides
a definite regulatory constraint, limiting the CRTC's discretion and ensuring that
broadcasters know the scope of the regulations.
Second, while the Act's "high standard" provision considered alone could con-
ceivably be challenged for vagueness, the Code's regulations, as clarifications of the
high standard requirement with respect to television violence, are sufficiently intel-
ligible to avoid a claim of vagueness. In Irwin Toy, the Court held that the Quebec
statute prohibiting commercial broadcasting aimed at children was prescribed by law
partly because the statute provided factors for the government to take into account
when deciding whether to apply the law. 9 Similarly, the Code gives broadcasters
and regulators a more precise idea of what will constitute impermissible violence.
Thus, the Code ought to pass a "prescribed by law" test.'
(D) IS THE CODE A REASONABLE LIMIT DEMONSTRABLY JUSTIFIED?
Once a court finds an infringement of the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression, s. 1
requires the court to consider whether the regulation is a reasonable and justified
limit on the freedom. It is submitted that the Code would likely survive this
balancing test, although this article will offer a number of objections to such a
ruling.
As part of its balancing philosophy, the court does not treat all infringements as
if they were uniformly serious. Instead, the court has held that "not all expression
is equally worthy of protection. Nor are all infringements of free expression equally
86. Broadcasting Act, supra note 70, s. 3(l)(g).
87. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 983.
88. (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80 (C.A.).
89. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 983.
90. Although it is outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting in leaving this subject that if the
courts follow the test articulated above, the survival of the "high standard" provision seems
contingent upon whether the CRTC first sets out binding regulations about how the provision will
be applied. It is interesting to speculate whether decisions taken in the name of high standards
alone, and without any other clarification by the CRTC, would meet the "prescribed by law" test.
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serious." 91 One must ask whether the "nature of the expression" lies "at, or even
near, the core of the guarantee of freedom of expression."'
The court has identified three bases for the constitutional protection of freedom
of expression: "[Tihe pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual
self-fulfilment and human flourishing?" Given these justifications, "gratuitous
violence?' in commonplace commercial programming is arguably quite far from
the core of freedom of expression; hence, the value of the expression would lose
weight when balanced with countervailing factors under s. 1.
Furthermore, a court may assume about most television programming what
Sopinka J. said about pornography in the Butler 4 decision: that "the targeted ma-
terial is expression which is motivated, in the overwhelming majority of cases, by
economic profit." 5 Restrictions on such expression, said Sopinka J., quoting the
decision in Rocket,' may be "easier to justify than other infringements."97 Thus, it
would be easier to regulate violent programming if it is viewed as having primarily
a profit-seeking function, rather than an expressive purpose.
But it may be argued that artistic expression generally, even when it is motivated
in part by a desire for profit, is an intimate part of individual self-fulfillment, for
both creator and audience. In Butler, the Court emphasized the importance of
making an exception in the obscenity law for works with "scientific, artistic or
literary merit," adding that "[tihe existence of an accompanying economic motive
does not, of itself, deprive a work of significance as an example of individual artistic
or self-fulfilment." 98
Although most programs involving televised violence undoubtedly are aired to
generate ratings and attract advertisers, they may nonetheless also constitute an
attempt at artistic and personal expression by their creator or creators.' To the
extent that these programs represent valuable artistic expression, they may also
serve the audience's desire to participate in a community of viewers and to find
self-fulfillment through the experience of art. Hence, televised violence may still
91. Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 247, McLachlin J.
[hereinafter Rocket].
92. Reference Re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123
at 1135-36, Dickson CJ.C.
93. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 977.
94. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (upholding the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code)
[hereinafter Butler].
95. Ibid. at 501.
96. Supra note 91.
97. Butler, supra note 94 at 501 (citation omitted).
98. Ibid. at 505-06.
99. Consider NYPD Blue, a program which premiered on ABC in the 1993-94 television season and
which contains frequent scenes of violence. At one and the same time, it has been one of the
most vilified, popular, and critically acclaimed programs of the season. This suggests that a single
program may be the locus of concerns about violence, profit-seeking, and artistic quality.
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be defended as speech rooted in core expressive values. Further, where the vi-
olence relates to news and public affairs programming, the expression would be
considerably more important, given its relationship to the pursuit of truth.
Having established how the courts may view the relative importance of the
expression infringed by the Code, one can move on to a s. 1 analysis of the Code,
using as a framework the test established by R. v. Oakes.'"°
(E) DOES THE LEGISLATION ADDRESS A PRESSING AND SUBSTANTIAL CON-
CERN?
Under the Oakes test, the legislative objective must "relate to concerns which are
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be character-
ized as sufficiently important" to outweigh an infringement of a particular Charter
guarantee.'' In this case, the concerns must be those of the administrative body
enforcing the Code-the CRTC.
As recounted above, the Commission has not asserted that the most dangerous but
least likely consequences of televised violence-namely, a general increase in acts
of violence-are the pressing and substantial concern addressed by the Code, de-
spite the suggestion by the Chairman of the CRTC that censorship concerns ought
to take a back seat to the "medical problem"' 3 2 of television violence. Instead,
the CRTC has emphasized "the link between massive, gratuitous TV violence and
desensitization of children, leading to greater tolerance for real-life violence, emo-
tional problems, school-yard bullying, and learning problems."'t 3 These problems
may be considerably more abstract and less indicative of a state of emergency than
actual acts of violence, but they seem sufficiently concrete to warrant the court's
agreement that they present a pressing and substantial problem for the government.
The Supreme Court has indicated its unwillingness to second-guess the govern-
ment's evaluation of conflicting scientific opinions.'" Thus, it is likely that the
Court would accept the CRTC's assertion that there is a pressing and substantial
concern addressed by the Code. Even though the possible social consequences of
television violence put forward by the CRTC, such as an increase in the tolerance of
violence, are much less pressing than the health concern posed by a fear of imitative
violence, the threshold for substantial concern may be lower because the objective
of the Code is to protect children. In Irwin Toy, which dealt with commercial rather
than artistic expression, the Court's "pressing and substantial concern" analysis took
into account:
100. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, Dickson CJ.C. [hereinafter Oakes].
101. Ibid. at 138-39.
102. Between the Lines, supra note 2.
103. Spicer, supra note 21 at A-11; see also note 53 and accompanying text.
104. See e.g. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 990.
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*.. the particular susceptibility of young children to media manipulation, their inability
to differentiate between reality and fiction ... and the secondary effects of exterior
influences on the family and parental authority.
105
Even a libertarian approach to regulation may accept the need for greater stric-
tures where children are concerned:
We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law
may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require
being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as
against external injury. 1'6
Clearly, then, the Code could pass the first branch of the Oakes test, given current
"pressing and substantial concern" jurisprudence. As Professor Hogg has noted, the
general practice of the Supreme Court indicates that "[i]t has been easy to persuade
the Court that, when the Parliament or Legislature acts in derogation of individual
rights, it is doing so to further values that are.., pressing and substantial..."101
Typically, then, the courts will be quite deferential when the government purports
to have pressing concerns. Nevertheless, in two important s. 2(b) cases which
involved a dispute over the social consequences of the expression in question, the
court showed somewhat less deference than it usually does. Rather than simply
list the government's research and conclusions, the court displayed some desire
to satisfy itself that the evidence genuinely indicated a pressing and substantial
concern.1
08
I would suggest that this more searching approach is the best way to apply the
pressing and substantial concern test, in freedom of expression cases and in other
Charter litigation. The very act of granting supremacy to certain rights by enshrin-
ing them in a charter indicates that they are so highly valued that the Canadian
people wish to make sure that government cannot easily infringe them. Moreover,
since it is the state's conduct in infringing a Charter right that is at issue in a Char-
ter challenge, the state's claims in justification of its actions should be viewed with
105. Ibid. at 987.
106. J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1947) at 10.
107. Hogg, supra note 76 at 870.
108. See e.g. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 722-25, 745-49 (examining evidence of the
effects of hate propaganda) [hereinafter Keegstra]; Butler, supra note 94 at 491-98. Admittedly,
both these cases involved the Criminal Code and not regulatory provisions. I would argue,
however, that this distinction is more relevant to later stages of s. 1 review, such as the minimal
impairment test, if it is relevant at all. This is because the "pressing and substantial concern" test
focuses on whether a law is necessary, an issue which does not touch directly on whether the law
is too harsh or overbroad. These concerns relate to proportionality, which is dealt with in
subsequent stages of s. 1 review.
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skepticism. Therefore, the courts should be less deferential to the government's
claims in Charter challenges than they are in other actions. 1' 9
Given the relatively tenuous nature of the claim of a direct causal link between
televised violence and real violence or other substantial dangers, the Code presents
an opportunity for the court to suggest that a reasonable evidentiary standard indicat-
ing a pressing and substantial concern simply has not been met. Recall that despite
the CRTC's confidence in its claims, the Standing Committee on Communications
and Culture was less certain:
[I]f a higher level of government action should subsequently be required, it seems to
the Committee that the government would then need more Canadian evidence than
presently exists.110
Still, as long as the deference currently paid to Parliament by the courts contin-
ues, the government would be unlikely to face any serious difficulty meeting the
"pressing and substantial concern" test.
Another issue that may be examined under the rubric of "pressing and substantial
concern" is whether the medium itself has an influence on the importance of the
government's content-specific regulation. Does television have inherent qualities or
dangers that make the government's goal more pressing or substantial? Certainly
the degree of intrusiveness of the CRTC generally, and the intrusiveness of the Code
particularly, suggest that the government is more willing to control expression in
the broadcast media than in the print media. A brief look at common rationales
for broadcast regulation shows that the courts are, in fact, likely to allow more
infringement of freedom of expression in the interest of regulating this medium.
It is also clear, however, that these rationales constitute questionable bases for
judgment.
One common rationale for stricter scrutiny of broadcast content is codified in the
Broadcasting Act."' The Act declares: "[T]he Canadian broadcasting system...
makes use of radio frequencies that are public property .".., In one of the few
post-Charter broadcasting cases, Re N.B. Broadcasting Co. and CRTC, the Federal
Court of Appeal held that a regulation restricting ownership of broadcast licenses
by daily newspapers did not violate s. 2(b) of the Charter. Using the Act's public
property declaration as the basis for his ruling, Thurlow C.J wrote: "[The Charter]
gives no right to anyone to use the radio frequencies which, before the enactment of
109. For a U.S. approach to this question, see e.g. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144 at 152 n. 4 (1938). Rejecting a due process challenge to an economic regulation, Stone J.
wrote: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.. ." The
footnote suggests that the Court will scrutinize legislation more closely if Constitutional rights are
implicated.
110. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note I at 18. See note 52 and accompanying text.
111. Broadcasting Act, supra note 70.
112. Ibid. s. 3(1)(b).
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the Charter, had been declared by Parliament to be and had become public property
and subject to the licensing and other provisions of the Broadcasting Act."' . The
Federal Court, Trial Division has held that the CRTC cannot act as a "censor of the
contents of any individual programme.""' 4 However, this appears simply to mean
that the Commission's punitive power is limited to the draconian step of altering
a broadcaster's licence status, as opposed to interfering in individual programming
questions. Therefore, the courts might still use the public property argument to
uphold the need to police the airwaves for violence.
On the other hand, it may be that a public property argument is better suited
to cases such as N.B. Broadcasting which involve issues of access rather than
content regulation. In United States jurisprudence, the comparable case is Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, in which the court used the public property argument to
uphold the Fairness Doctrine, requiring broadcasters to present opposing points of
view on controversial public issues." 5 In a later critique of Red Lion, Douglas J.
defined the limit of this argument: "[P]arks are also in the public domain. Yet people
who speak there do not come under Government censorship."" 6 Thus, while the
public property rationale will surely have an influence in Canada given its presence
in the Act, the courts' application of the rationale could be limited to issues of
access, not content regulation.
A related argument is 'that the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum-that is, the
fact that there is a finite limit on the number of available broadcast channels-
may make the government's regulatory purposes more pressing."7 This rationale
has been the subject of heated criticism, on the grounds that the availability of
channels has climbed sharply in recent years and that the appearance of scarcity
is artificial, based on the high demand caused by awarding licences at a low cost
that does not reflect possible revenues."' In any case, the same caveats apply to
the spectrum scarcity rationale as to the public property rationale: it may justify
ensuring increased access to the media, but it does not necessarily justify content
regulation.
Finally, there is the argument that television is a uniquely powerful and pervasive
medium, and hence prima facie presents a more compelling need for regulation." 9
113. Re N.B. Broadcasting Co. Ltd. and CRTC (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 77 at 89 (F.C.A.).
114. Nat'l Indian Brotherhood v. Juneau [No. 3], [1971] F.C. 498 at 516.
115. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 at 388-90 (1968), White J [hereinafter Red
Lion]. The FCC subsequently rescinded the Fairness Doctrine, declaring it unconstitutional. See 2
FCC Red Vol. 17 5043 (1987).
116. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 at 162 (1972),
Douglas J. (concurring) [hereinafter CBS v. DNC].
117. See e.g. Lepofsky, supra note 11 at 114.
118. See e.g. I. Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1983) at 138-154. Pool
states [at 151]: "The time has come to bury the old clich6 that spectrum is a scarce resource. It is
an abundant resource, but a squandered and misused one."
119. For a discussion of this argument, see E. Barendt, Broadcasting Law: A Comparative Study
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 6; see also Pacifica, infra note 140 (dealing with the
regulation of radio programming).
368 Toronto, Faculty of Law Review Volume 52, Number 2
Since children are the target of at least some of the Code's provisions, as well as
being the focus of the CRTC's justifications, courts may well adopt this rationale
in finding a more pressing and substantial need to regulate broadcast media.2 0
To sum up, courts are likely to find that the purpose of the Code is pressing and
substantial. This finding is likely to be grounded in the fact that children are the
target of the government's justification, and in the public property declaration in
the Broadcasting Act. But both the inconclusive scientific evidence regarding the
effects of television violence, and the shaky rationales for strict regulation of the
broadcast media qua media, suggest that such a decision would not be without its
problems.'
(F) IS THERE A RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S PUR-
POSE AND THE CODE'S PROVISIONS?
The second part of the Oakes test requires an examination of whether the Code's pro-
visions are "rationally connected to the objective" of the government.2 2 The regula-
tion must be designed to meet the government's purported pressing and substantial
concern, and it cannot be "arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations."'
If one accepts the validity of the government's assessment of the social science
research, then the children's programming section of the Code, which directs broad-
casters not to depict too much violence or send the wrong message about violence
in programs aimed at children under 12 years old,124 seems rationally connected
to the objective of protecting children from harm. The scheduling and warning
systems, inasmuch as they aid parents in regulating their children's viewing, also
appear to meet the rational connection test.
Since many children typically stay up to watch programs scheduled after the
watershed point, a court might also accept the Code's general prohibitions against
gratuitous violence and violence directed at certain groups or at animals. Less of a
rational connection applies here, however, since such programs may be intended for
adults and hence lie beyond the scope of the CRTC's justifications for regulating
televised violence, which focus primarily on harm to children.
120. But see Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 44 at 1232-33 (referring to the Pacifica decision):
"[O]ne searches the majority's opinions in vain for any explanation of the conclusion that radio is
intrusive while records, books, newspapers, magazines, and letters are not. All enter the home.
All may contain surprises. All may be easily accessible to unsupervised children."
121. One statutory rationale for content regulation in Canadian broadcasting clearly does not apply
here, but given its importance to other content regulation it merits mention. This is the
declaration that programming should "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political,
social and economic fabric of Canada." Broadcasting Act, supra note 70, s. 3(l)(d)(i). Violent
programming may not enrich the Canadian cultural fabric, but the provision seems to be aimed
more at encouraging the development of Canadian culture than at charting a particular cultural
course. This is more evident in s. 3(1)(d)(ii) of the Act, which encourages the "displaying [of]
Canadian talent in entertainment programming," without dictating programming content.
122. Oakes, supra note 100 at 139.
123. Ibid.
124. Code, supra note 6, s. 2.0.
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News and public affairs programming is unquestionably directed at adults, and
mostly viewed by adults; hence, if the Code's regulatory cautions regarding such
programming are found to infringe s. 2(b), it would be difficult to find a ratio-
nal connection between the provisions and the goals of the Code, since few chil-
dren are likely to watch news programs and adults are unlikely to be harmed by
watching them. A provision aimed at regulating news programming might there-
fore be viewed as not having been "carefully designed to achieve the objective in
question."'"
On the whole, then, most of the Code would likely meet the rational connection
test as it is usually applied. But is this the best test? As suggested above, where
a law is challenged on the grounds that it violates the Charter, a more searching
examination of the government's reasoning may be appropriate. A preferable test
in this context might be one set out in dissent by McLachlin J. in Canada (Human
Rights Commission) v. Taylor
Rational connection must be viewed, not only from the perspective of the intention
of the legislators, but from the perspective of whether in fact the law is likely to
accomplish its objectives. Latitude must be accorded to the legislators, but where it
appears that the law is unlikely to achieve the ends.., it cannot be said to be rationally
connected to those objectives.
26
Under such a test, the chances of showing a rational connection would drop
considerably. Given the various environmental factors faced by television viewers,
it is unlikely that reducing televised violence would achieve much reduction of
actual violence or violent tendencies among viewers, who absorb violent messages
in any number of ways. Previous studies have therefore focused more on the ease
of regulating televised violence than on the effectiveness of doing so:
We believe that, while increased exploitation and depiction of violence in the media
is only one of the many social factors contributing to crime, it is the largest single
variable most amenable to rectification.
127
Furthermore, since warnings are usually only broadcast at the beginning of a show
or at periodic intervals thereafter, viewers are quite likely to miss them altogether,
thus rendering the warning requirement ineffective. The availability of the same
material in other media, and the possibility of children videotaping programs aired at
later hours, also underscore the Code's potential ineffectiveness. As one researcher
noted:
125. Oakes, supra note 100 at 139.
126. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 at 960, McLachlin J.
(dissenting).
127. Ontario, Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry, Report: Approaches,
Conclusions and Recommendations, vol. 1 (Toronto: Queen's Printer 1977) at 53.
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The matter [of regulating televised violence] gets even more complicated when it is
realized that, partially at least, open network television may be (and in some areas
already has been) replaced by a system enabling consumers to determine their own
programing [sic]i.
28
As long as the current, generally deferential rational connection test is applied,
however, most of the Code should pass this test.
(G) DOES THE CODE IMPAIR EXPRESSION AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE?
Oakes states that the Code should "impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom
in question."' 29 Generally, the courts have ruled that the government need only
show a "reasonable basis, on the basis of the evidence tendered, for concluding"
that the regulation "impair[s] freedom of expression as little as possible given the
government's pressing and substantial objective."'30 As with the rational connection
branch, most of the Code's provisions would likely pass such a test, since they
bar only limited and extreme incidents of televised violence, and allow adults to
continue watching most programming, with the aid of the viewer advisory system.
One argument may be raised against the Code under this branch, however. If
the Code is overbroad-if by its terms it would restrict more expression than was
its intent-it may fail the minimal impairment test. 3' The vagueness of the terms
involved here may make the Code overbroad. Violence which is incidental but
mild or stylized (a moment of slapstick violence on a sitcom, for example) may
be beyond the intended scope of the Code but nonetheless covered by s. 1.1. And
news broadcasts may effectively "glamorize" violence, also in violation of s. 1 of
the Code-by showing victorious, 'unpunished' troops in battle, for instance. The
difficulty of determining which televised violence ought to be barred means the
regulations may simply sweep up reasonable programs in" their path, thus violating
this branch of the Oakes test. The Standing Committee on Communications and
Culture acknowledged this problem, declaring that "the broad language and wide
discretion contained in [voluntary] codes would be unacceptable in legislation." 32
(H) IS THERE PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MEASURE
AND ITS EFFECTS?
The final branch of the s. 1 test seeks to ensure that the benefit conferred by the
infringement is significant in relation to the infringed Charter right.133 Whether the
128. T.H.A. van der Voort, Television Violence: A Child's-Eye View (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing, 1986) at 101.
129. Oakes, supra note 100 at 139, citing Big M, supra note 78 at 352.
130. Irwin Toy, supra note 71 at 994.
131. See e.g. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139,
L'Heureux-Dub J.
132. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at 45.
133. Oakes, supra note 100 at 139.
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Code meets this part of the test depends on the manner in which the judge seeks to
effect a balance. In Keegstra, Dickson C.J.C., speaking for the Court, considered
narrowly "[tihe expressive activity at which this provision aim[ed]."'' In contrast,
McLachlin J.'s dissent gave a greater weight to freedom of expression values by
considering all the possible penumbral effects that the hate propaganda provision
might have on free speech, not just the effects of the particular infringement caused
by the provision.'
35
If one follows the majority's reasoning in this case, clearly the Code constitutes
a relatively minor infringement, although the benefit conferred may also be small.
On the other hand, following McLachlin J., the infringement here can be seen as a
potentially broad and sweeping regulation of expressive content that would threaten
both journalistic and artistic expression, striking at "viewpoints in widely diverse
domains, whether artistic, social or political.' ' 36 In either case, the courts should
keep in mind that the crux of a strong proportionality test should be whether any
benefits are actually received in exchange for the infringement of a Charter right.
This view of the test paraphrases Krattenmaker & Powe:
The nature of the first amendment dictates that the true questions are whether these
harms [that the provision is aimed at alleviating] are tangible, concrete, and avoidable
only by censorship.
137
In other words, a court should use this branch of the test to make sure that the
government is acting in response to a real problem, and that the government's
solution is effective enough to justify the draconian step of infringing a Charter
right.
On balance, a court that finds that the Code meets the other branches of the
Oakes test is unlikely to strike down the regulation here, since at least a primafacie
case can be made for proportionality. Still, it is clear that a great deal of expression
(albeit much of it may be unwanted) has been curtailed, in exchange for a benefit
that is potentially quite small.
(1) SUMMARY
Given the court's deference to the government on matters of social science research
and other evidence leading to policy conclusions, it seems certain that a fairly
wide range of content regulations for broadcast programs would pass constitutional
muster, at least as long as the provision is aimed at children. However, an appro-
priate respect for the Charter dictates that, where a bedrock right is at stake, the
court should adopt a more searching approach, questioning whether a pressing and
134. Keegstra, supra note 108 at 787.
135. Ibid. at 863-64.
136. Ibid. at 863.
137. Supra note 44 at 1296.
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substantial purpose really exists, and scrutinizing the real benefit that is likely to
be gained from the infringement. Under such an analysis, given the absence of
evidence that the Code would have any significant effect in reaching its desired
goals, the provisions that regulate general content or that affect news programming
would not constitute a justifiable infringement of s. 2(b) of the Charter.
V. The Code's Implications
If the Code is considered constitutional, there are a number of implications for
broadcasters in terms of its applications and in terms of other content regulations.
First, of course, if the CRTC can effectively put the threat of more onerous
legislation-or of licence non-renewal and other financial nightmares-behind its
"wooing" without bringing the resulting self-regulation into the sphere of govern-
ment action, then it may be able to coax broadcasters to engage in further self-
censorship. Viewers who despair at the quality of modern television programming
might wish for further changes in broadcasters' standards; nonetheless, a coercive
approach to reforming television programming is misguided. Such an approach
gives the CRTC substantial leeway to regulate content by so-called 'persuasion,'
while leaving itself outside the scope of administrative or Charter review.
On this score, one should note the existence of another CAB programming code,
the Sex-Role Portrayal Code for Television and Radio Programming. This code,
which requires broadcasters to "advance the awareness of, and sensitivity to, the
problems related to the negative or inequitable sex-role portrayal of persons," was
promulgated and revised at the direction of the CRTC. 138
Extensions of the Code dealing with violence could also follow. The current
Code simply limits certain kinds of violence. Since the CRTC has emphasized the
importance of the amount of violence one watches, future "self-regulation" could
seek to impose quotas on the amount of violence that may be shown by a broad-
caster, or to require that a given percentage of programming meet a "responsibility"
standard-that is, some programs would have to advance appropriate moral lessons
or dissuade certain behaviour (for example, violence). Particularly where children
are concerned, and possibly beyond, the CRTC could urge such 'self-regulation' on
the grounds of protecting "public health" or morals.'39
More broadly, the reasoning that could support the Code could also support
regulation of other forms of televised material. One example may be "indecent"
language-that is, the use of shocking or profane language, at least where it may
catch the attention of children. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, a case concern-
ing the daytime radio broadcast of a monologue by comic George Carlin which
138. Canadian Association of Broadcasters, "Sex-Role Portrayal Code for Television and Radio
Programming" (1990) in Grant, Keenleyside & Racicot, 1993 Canadian Broadcast and Cable
Regulatory Handbook, supra note 19 at 351.
139. See Albert, supra note 5 at 1334 ("A broadcaster must serve the public interest, which includes
public health ... ").
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contained repeated profanities, the United States Supreme Court held that such lan-
guage could be regulated during the daytime hours, even though the radio program
in question had been aimed at adults. 4' The Court held that the pervasive nature
of the broadcast media, and the fact that children can gain easy access to television
(unlike literature, which requires that its consumers have reading skills), justified
the intrusion on the First Amendment.
Similarly, Canadian regulatory authorities could mount an effort to regulate pro-
fane or obscene lanaguage on television, arguing that a steady diet of such language
has harmful effects; at the least, an early desensitization to unruly behaviour might
result. Regulations aimed at such language would thus require substantial reschedul-
ing of programs, and perhaps an outright ban on "gratuitous" offensive language
where it is found not to serve any artistic purpose.
It is interesting to note that Pacifica may serve as the basis for content regulation
of televised violence in the United States, where in the past year a number of mem-
bers of Congress have introduced bills attempting to curtail violence on American
networks.'41 The United States Attorney General, Janet Reno, said in testimony
before the U.S. Senate last year that she felt the reasoning in Pacifica could be ap-
plied to proposed U.S. legislation regulating TV violence.'42 Her position has met
with opposition from the American Civil Liberties Union, which suggested, in a
letter signed by several dozen First Amendment scholars, '"hey [the pending bills]
involve a content and viewpoint bias that cannot be reconciled with the Constitu-
tion ... They are vague and overbroad... Moreover, violent speech does not fit
into the narrow and limited exception created by the Supreme Court for 'indecent'
speech when broadcast on radio or television.' 43
Finally, depending on the results of scientific studies, the government could
seek to apply similar violence restrictions to programming aimed more directly
at adults. While adults have the reasoning power that children are presumed to
lack, they may be subject to many of the same dangers, such as desensitization
or increased aggression. CRTC Chairman Spicer has disavowed any intention of
curtailing viewing choices for adults, telling panelists in a televised discussion, '"Me
state has no business whatever telling adults what to watch ... We should not keep
140. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
141. See H. Rosin, "The Producers" The New Republic (13 December 1993) 12.
142. J. Reno, Testimony (Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, 20 October 1993),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. In subsequent remarks, Reno and U.S. President
Bill Clinton, noting efforts at self-regulation by American broadcasters, see infra note 166 and
accompanying text, have indicated their preference for voluntary action over legislated action.
Reuters, "U.S. Backing Off From Controls On TV Violence" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (25
March 1994) C4 [hereinafter "U.S. Backing Off']. Of course, this does not respond to the
concern that so-called voluntary regulation will still be fundamentally the result of state coercion.
143. U.S. Newswire, "First Amendment Experts See Defects in TV Violence Bills; Congress Urged to
Abandon Constitutionally Flawed Proposals" (26 January 1994), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File.
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bringing the debate back to adults. They have nothing to do with this debate. They
should see whatever they want."' 4
Nevertheless, the same reasoning applies. Again, an analogy with Butler sug-
gests itself. That the consumers of pornography are mature and freely consenting
adults makes no difference to the validity of the regulation if a real risk of harm
is involved, and one could expect the voluntariness and maturity of an audience
viewing televised violence to make no difference either. What matters is that Par-
liament is "entitled to have a 'reasoned apprehension of harm' resulting from the
desensitization of individuals.. ."14' If the evidence of harmful effects on adults
were sufficiently convincing, future legislators or regulators might step in where
today's officials will not.
It should also be frankly noted that another possible result of the Code is that,
save for the addition of program ratings and advisories, little will change. Although
the Code could be strictly administered, CAB officials say they do not believe any
programs currently airing on private networks would qualify as gratuitous; rather,
the gratuitous violence provision is said to codify existing programming standards. 146
Nevertheless, this may change as the Code is administered, or if social pressure to
reduce violence on television mounts.
VI. Violence, Values, and Republican Theory
Ultimately, the regulation of televised violence amounts to much more than an effort
to solve a "medical problem." Note Mr. Spicer's suggestion that one motivation
for the CRTC's actions in urging private regulation is the fear of "desensitizing
[children] to cruelty," a concern which addresses, not a fear of positive violent
acts by children, but a more generalized fear of moral indifference. The Code also
appears to suggest that there are proper and improper lessons to be derived from
televised violence; thus, one should not learn that violence is the "preferred way...
to resolve conflict between individuals," though some viewers may hold that this is
true in some situations, or may watch such programs purely for their metaphorical
value. 1
In short, I suggest that these regulations advance an orthodoxy of values, essen-
tially putting forward an approved social viewpoint about violence and its portrayal.
As laudable as the goal of encouraging antipathy to violence may be, one may share
the goal while believing it ought to be achieved without content regulation.
Government regulation of expression, if it is the result of a desire to advance
a particular moral viewpoint and censor those who would express themselves
in an 'immoral' fashion-in this case, through the use of gratuitously violent
programming-would conflict with the general liberal view that speech rights,
144. Between the Lines, supra note 2.
145. Butler, supra note 94 at 504 (citation omitted).
146. Interview with Peter Miller, supra note 55.
147. Code, supra note 6, s. 2.6.
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among other rights, exist to protect individuals against the state. Such regulation
could, however, mesh with modern republican theory. Republican theory argues
that regulation which is shaped by people's true preferences, and which encourages
these preferences to flourish, may constitute an acceptable communitarian limitation
on choice. Under this approach, a laissez-faire attitude toward current programming
may reinforce a set of preferences that are themselves unreasonable, since people's
tastes may be the result of conditions such as a paucity of quality programming, or
social and educational inequality. Thus, in the case of television violence, regula-
tion reflects a more deliberative realization of our deeper preference for thoughtful
and unharmful programs, and allows us to enforce on the television screen a vision
of what we think our tastes should be, although, for various reasons, they are often
quite different. 4 '
In two recent books, Cass Sunstein has made a republican argument for a "New
Deal for speech," a new approach to speech issues which would favour greater
regulation. 4 9 In his view, speech and its regulation should be viewed as part
of a system which is "closely connected to the central constitutional goal of cre-
ating a deliberative democracy."'50 Speech should actively promote democratic
self-government. In the context of television, this means that broadcasters should
provide quality and diversity in their programming.'' Consequently, a legal regime
which allows broadcasters to compromise the goals of quality and diversity by
awarding them absolute free speech may be inconsistent with (in Sunstein's case)
the First Amendment; 5 ' and laws which reinforce these goals and encourage the
shaping of true public preferences will be constitutional, even though they may
abridge or affect speech.'
Sunstein suggests that violent programming will have a harmful social effect,
particularly when it is directed at children.' 54 Such programming would clearly
undermine quality standards, reflect false public preferences, and disserve Sunstein's
conception of a speech system which reinforces the "broader aspirations"'
5 5 of
a deliberative democratic polity. He notes with approval the efforts of various
148. See e.g. C.R. Sunstein, "Interest Groups in American Public Law" (1985) 38 Stanford L. Rev. 29
at 82: "Preferences adapt to the available options; they are not autonomous. In these
circumstances, politics properly has, as one of its central functions, the selection, evaluation, and
shaping of preferences, not simply their implementation.... There is, in short, something like a
'common good' or 'public interest' that may be distinct from the aggregation of private
preferences or utilities." The quotation is meant to illuminate republican theory and is not directed
specifically at television violence. A discussion of Sunstein's views on that subject follows below.
149. C.R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press, 1993)
at 17-51 [hereinafter Democracy and Free Speech]. That chapter and the rest of the book expand
on ideas developed in C.R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1993) at 197-231.
150. Democracy and Free Speech, ibid. at 18.
151. Ibid. at 20-23, 53.
152. Ibid. at 53.
153. Ibid at 71-75.
154. Ibid. at 66-67.
155. Ibid. at 75.
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countries to stem the flow of blood on television. 56 While he favours attacking
the problem first from an "incentive-based, market-oriented" approach rather than a
"command-and-control" approach, 157 there can be little doubt that Sunstein would
permit use of the stick if the carrot fails.'58
If the government is too ready to enforce choices about moral preferences, how-
ever, it runs the risk of engaging in "'legal moralism' ... a majority deciding what
values should inform individual lives and then coercively imposing those values
on minorities."' 59 Republican regulation of content may lead, not to more open or
clearer thinking about violence, but to well-intentioned "manipulation of the flow
of information and opinion."" °
In fact, the individual's fear of subjection to another's preferences in matters
such as speech or religion is what has driven and still motivates the free speech
guarantee. As Douglas J. wrote:
That fear [of government intrusion] was founded not only on the spectre of a lawless
government but of government under the control of a faction that desired to foist its
views of the common good on the people.'
6 1
Adopting this reasoning, one can see the Charter guarantee in s. 2(b) as one which
places freedom of expression outside the web of state influence, save for those
moments when some matter of genuine public urgency-a real emergency, and not
simply an unpleasant social outcome-forces an intrusion. Shifting our preferences
away from violence, like preventing "dirt for dirt's sake" in Butler, 62 does not
suffice; in order for the government to regulate televised violence, there must be a
substantial danger.
VII. Conclusion
This article has argued that most of the Voluntary Code Regarding Violence in
Television Programming, even if viewed as a government regulation, would likely
survive a Charter challenge alleging a violation of freedom of expression; how-
ever, its survival depends largely on the courts' reliance on an outmoded view of
broadcasting as a special medium that requires stricter content regulation than other
156. Ibid. at 80.
157. Ibid. at 82-84.
158. See e.g. his approach to children's programming, which would create positive obligations for
broadcasters to provide high-quality programming and to enforce existing rules limiting or barring
programs which are too commercial in nature. Ibid. at 84-5.
159. Butler, supra note 94 at 492 (citation omitted).
160. M.H. Redish & G. Lippman, "Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in
Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications" (1991) 79 Cal. L. Rev. 267 at 310. But see
G. Henley, "Preferences About Preferences: A Positive Justification for Canadian Content
Regulation" (1993) 3 M.C.L.R. 127.
161. CBS v. DNC, supra note 116 at 148.
162. Butler, supra note 94 at 492.
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media, and on their apparent view that the government deserves deference even
when it has acted to infringe our most basic rights. Between the courts' willingness
to control broadcasting strictly, and their deferential approach to the government,
the CRTC's argument that television violence presents a substantial health problem
is less likely to face the skeptical examination that it deserves.
As was stated in this article's introduction, our willingness in Canada to control
the flow of content through the broadcast media appears to reflect a "profound sense
of ambivalence about Canada's mass media."' Similarly, one writer (discussing
general views of the broadcast media rather than a Canadian viewpoint) has noticed:
... a certain psychological attitude toward the electronic media. Many people regard
television, for instance, as being too powerful and influential to be allowed freedom
from government control ... It may be that all of this is no deeper than the fear with
which the medieval church and state viewed the technology of printing.
164
It is incontestable that this medium, although barely out of its infancy, is influen-
tial. But fear of its powers does not lead to careful consideration of the reasonable-
ness of regulating what goes on the air. In the case of televised violence, the weak
evidence showing the effects of television-watching only succeeds in supporting the
Code's rigorous content regulations if it is further assumed that the medium carries
risks substantially greater than those posed by other media.
Even if the medium has greater potential influence than other media, I would
argue that its influence is not strong enough to warrant government pressure on
broadcasters to convey particular values and shun others, praiseworthy as those
values may be. 165 Indeed, we should be particularly leery of these efforts, since
they establish as regular procedure a government effort to achieve its ends in an
extra-governmental manner, by using the threat of regulation to force broadcasters
to codify rules that the CRTC might--or might not-be able to promulgate itself.
The free speech issues involved are not academic, neither in Canada nor anywhere
else. In Canada, Parliament may yet decide to turn this "voluntary" code into law,
or to pass a stricter code. 64 In the United States, legislators warn, "If the TV and
cable industries have no sense of shame, we must take it upon ourselves to stop
licensing their violence-saturated programming."" The possibility of regulation
163. Lepofsky, supra note 11 at 90.
164. B.M. Owen, "Radio and Television," in Free But Regulated, supra note 61 at 44.
165. See Barendt, supra note 119 at 7: "[I]t is probably true that broadcasting is the most influential
medium of communication. But it is doubtful whether the case is powerful enough to justify the
radically different legal treatment of the press and broadcasting media."
166. Fraying Our Social Fabric, supra note 1 at 61. See also D. Vienneau, "Ottawa Weighing Options
to Curb Television Violence" The Toronto Star (21 February 1994) A13. The article quotes Justice
Minister Allan Rock disclosing (less than two months after the implementation of the Code) that
Heritage Minister Michel Dupuy "is examining the question of whether government can influence
broadcasters in the subject of the kind and extent of violence that is shown on television."
167. Sen. E. Hollings, "Save the Children" The New York Times (23 November 1993) A21. In
February 1994, American network broadcasters announced they would hire an independent
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is also raised in a statement by the French communications minister in the fall of
1993, announcing that he will seek international regulations to reduce violence on
television."6
The evidence and arguments now mustered against televised violence only await
their application to other content. Ithiel de Sola Pool observed, "The new commu-
nication technologies have not inherited all the legal immunities that were won for
the old." '69 Sooner rather than later, it is important that they do.
monitor to scrutinize violence on U.S. network television; the National Television Cable
Association said it would develop a violence rating system. Some members of Congress
nonetheless indicated they would continue to push for legislation. See T. Poor, "Lawmakers Press
Ahead With TV Violence Bills; Monitor Plan 'Doesn't Solve Problem,' Critics Say" The St. Louis
Post-Dispatch (2 February 1994) 4A; B. Talbott, "TV Dodges Congress Rules; Simon Says Plan
to Rate Violent Shows Satisfies Him" The Chicago Sun-imes (2 February 1994) 3. According to
one report, nine bills purporting to regulate television violence either directly or indirectly were
still pending in Congress as of March 1994. See "U.S. Backing Off," supra note 142.
168. Reuter News Agency, "France Seeks World Curb on Television Violence" The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (2 December 1993) A10.
169. Pool, supra note 118 at 1.
